Escalating Language at Traffic Stops: Two Case Studies by Haley, Jamalieh
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
9-22-2017 
Escalating Language at Traffic Stops: Two Case 
Studies 
Jamalieh Haley 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the African American Studies Commons, Applied Linguistics Commons, and the Law 
Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Haley, Jamalieh, "Escalating Language at Traffic Stops: Two Case Studies" (2017). Dissertations and 
Theses. Paper 3887. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.5775 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and 
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
Escalating Language at Traffic Stops: Two Case Studies 
by 
Jamalieh Haley 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
in 
Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages 
Thesis Committee: 
Keith Walters, Chair 
Tetyana Sydorenko 
Alissa Hartig 
Portland State University 
2017
Abstract 
In recent years, the public has seen a rise in recorded footage of violent encounters 
between police and Black American citizens, partially due to technology such as cell 
phones, dash-cameras, and body-cameras. This linguistic study examines how these 
encounters get escalated to the point of violence by asking 1) what kind of directives were 
used, 2) how were they responded to, 3) how the directives contributed to escalation, and 
4) how might power and authority have played a role. I use two case studies to analyze
directives and their responses. Findings reveal that repetition of directives on the part of 
the officers, as well as the rejections to those directives on the part of the motorists tend to 
aggravate the conversation. I conclude that a variety of directives may represent a variety 
of reasons the officer might have for a motorist to comply with their directives and that 
police authority might be better understood and agreed to by the motorist if a variety of 
linguistic resources were used. 
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This thesis builds on Haley (2016), a pilot study, by examining the speech acts 
involved in what should have been two routine traffic stops that escalated to violence. 
Because of racial differences between the police officers, neither of whom was Black, and 
the drivers, both of whom were Black American women, and because of the violent 
outcomes, these incidents became part of a larger societal debate about police treatment of 
Black Americans at traffic stops, implicating both race and gender in their interactions. 
I investigate disagreement patterns and characteristics of those patterns in the 
interactions between the police officers and citizens they stop in my data. Specifically, I 
look at speech acts to help uncover the directives as a major category of communicative 
illocutionary acts used by either the police officer, the citizen, or both. Further, my 
analysis examines what types of directives were used, whether there is evidence the hearer 
understood the directive as intended, and how those types of directives were responded to. 
I build on this analysis by exploring the sociolinguistic implications embedded within 
these interactions, particularly the dynamics of power and authority between police and 
African Americans. Ultimately, I seek to discover how language likely contributed to the 
escalations that led to the violent outcomes in the encounters looked at in this study. The 
paper will seek to address the following questions: 
• Was there a particular class of directive (Bach, 1998) that was used
more frequently than others in these traffic stops, and what is the
patterning of those classes?
• Were the directives understood and accepted as such by the hearer? If so,
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how? 
• How did the directives used likely contribute to the escalation of
these interactions into violence?
• Were the directives used reflective of the situational and institutional
power at work in these encounters, and how did that power likely
contribute to how the encounter unfolded?
To achieve these goals, first I review the broader context of the data and research on 
traffic stop settings, speech acts, and the ways power and authority interact with each. In 
the methods section, I then discuss how I will use the tools from speech act theory and 
discourse analysis to analyze these incidents, again building on Haley (2016). My analysis 
reviews the two cases, one by one, and then discusses the implications of power and how 
the results of this study might be used. The final section of the thesis draws conclusions 
and discusses some implications of the analysis. 
  2
Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
This chapter has two functions: to explore the social context in which the data 
occur and to explore the research that supports the analysis. 
The Broader Context
Recently, violent encounters between police and Black Americans have drawn the 
pointed attention of the media in the United States. Particularly, encounters during traffic 
stops seem to be salient examples of racialized violence many Americans are concerned 
about. Here, I explore some of the background of racial prejudice and how it is connected 
to policing. 
Events such as the ones in my data must not be looked at in isolation from the 
broader context of the civic disenfranchisement of Black Americans or the history of the 
civil rights movement in the US. Many Black Americans feel they are denied full 
citizenship and freedom in their own country, fueled partially by the fraught relationship 
between the Black community and law enforcement and the criminal justice system. 
Perhaps part of the public response to encounters such as the ones in my data asks why 
disproportionate numbers of traffic stops continue to involve a particular racial group, 
Black Americans; that is, since Black Americans say they feel targeted, is it likely that 
their responses while being stopped reflect that burden? 
The social context of racialized violence might help to shed some light on what 
kind of language is used in these interactions and how that language reflects the deep 
feelings involved. Particularly, the recent social movement Black Lives Matter has 
heightened awareness around racial injustice. With the movement has come more public 
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expressions of deep dissatisfaction from both the black community, who feels targeted by 
police, and their supporters, on the one hand, and critics, who label the movement as anti- 
police, on the other. This dynamic has begun to stir up anger and action from Americans 
on all sides of this issue, while events such as the ones in these data demonstrate that a 
very real contention exists between police and motorists in this particular setting and 
under the authority of policing. 
My analysis will focus on two separate encounters, each documented by dash- 
camera and made public by the police. One such video documents the traffic stop that led 
to Sandra Bland’s arrest in July 2015 in Waller County, Texas. Ms. Bland made efforts to 
protect herself, but also efforts of protest and resistance. Her arresting officer, Brian 
Encinia, showed efforts to invoke both his institutional and perhaps personal authority and 
to compel Bland to comply with that authority. The second encounter I look at involves 
school teacher Breaion King and an officer in the city of Austin, Texas in July 2015; this 
encounter quickly became violent after the officer stopped King for speeding while on her 
lunch break. King was pulled from her vehicle and flipped onto the pavement after she 
would not put both her feet in her car. 
In the following sub-sections, I build an argument about the nature of power 
structures and authority by discussing traffic stop settings as well as speech acts. 
Traffic Stop Settings
Traffic stop settings are unique both in social and institutional context and in 
research. Much research has been published in the forensic field as to Fourth Amendment 
rights and Terry searches at traffic stop settings, as well as to the expected nature of traffic 
stops (LaFave, 2004; Lawrence, 2004). (The Fourth Amendment guards against citizens 
4
being searched unreasonably while a Terry search is one in which the Supreme Court 
holds that if police have reasonable suspicion that a person stopped is about to be engaged 
in criminal activity, they may detain and search a motorist.) Traffic stop interactions 
generally follow a routine; for the officer, the language used is commonly an institutional 
action that includes a series of directives: asking for a license, asking where the motorist 
is coming from and going to, questioning about identities, as well as directing future 
action. This routine also usually involves criminal history and outstanding warrants 
checks (LaFave, 2004). For the motorist, the routine usually involves answering the 
officer’s questions and providing relevant information, including accounts of their 
activity. When the routine is interrupted or goes off course, both the officer and the 
motorist may need to improvise the language they use. Lawrence (2004) asserted that 
when issues during routine traffic stops arise, it is often correlated with the officer asking 
questions that are unrelated to the stated original reason for the stop. 
Traffic stops hold potential danger for both police and citizens. In response to the 
potential danger to police, the United States Supreme Court has reinforced police 
institutional authority in cases such as Whren v. U.S. (1996), which allows for more 
individual agency in policing. Such agency is seen to play out in actions such as searches, 
removals from vehicles, and use of force (as seen in the data in this paper). All these 
elements have contributed to social contention about the traffic stop setting, necessarily 
heightening anxiety around potential encounters for both parties. In addition to concern 
for police safety at traffic stops are growing public perceptions of police as violent or 
abusive of their power (Capehart, 2015; Whitehead, 2015), racial profiling before and 
during stops (Epp, 2014), and the salience of media coverage of violent encounters 
5
between police and Black American motorists. 
In linguistic research on police-citizen interactions, studies have centered mostly 
on interrogation or question settings or responses to 911 calls (Ainsworth, 2008; Mason, 
2016; Stygall, 2008). Many of these studies have focused on coercion, problematic talk, 
or interrogative speech acts and found that power and register play a large role in how 
police communicate with citizens, particularly in bilingual settings (Berk-Seligson, 2009). 
Given the limited existing linguistic research on police-citizen interactions at 
traffic stops, it is necessary to narrow the focus of these interactions beyond what the 
research has already addressed; traffic stop settings are unique in their tenuous dynamics 
of police authority in combination with motorists theoretically having some agency. 
Contrasted with citizens brought in for questioning, interrogated in connection with 
serious crimes, or having called for help, motorists at traffic stops usually remain in their 
vehicles and are often culpable of only minor infractions, such as failing to signal or 
missing a tail light. While the context seems to beg for an analysis rooted in sociology, 
the studies mentioned above compel linguistic questions and show that police-citizen 
interactions manifest themselves in and through talk. Thus, in addition to insights from 
other disciplines, understanding the traffic stop setting requires a linguistic approach to 
potentially understand how interactions can unfold so dramatically. 
Power in Traffic Stop Settings
In this section, I explore how existing research has yet to focus on power through 
language between officers and motorists at traffic stops. Many sociology and criminology 
studies have focused on traffic stops to investigate police leniency (Farrell, 2015), police 
and driver demeanor (Engle et al., 2012), gender bias (Blalock, 2011), and racial profiling 
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(Carroll et al., 2014; Childers, 2012; Rojeck, 2012). In slightly broader legal settings, 
escalation has been investigated through a linguistic lens: Matoesian (2005) argued that 
the unfolding of control and resistance talk in trial settings yields identity contextualizing, 
where identity is manipulated through discursive practice; “human agency is fundamental 
to any negotiation of power and social interaction” (Smith, 2010, p. 173). Such research 
likely hold implications for police language and traffic discourse. 
Smith (2010) built upon Matoesian’s claim, but concluded that talk reflects power 
in contextualized settings. For instance, at a traffic stop, the talk is expected to uniquely 
reflect the power dynamic of that context, and such talk will not likely be used outside of 
that context. According to Smith, settings like this one are contextualized through identity 
locally (at the time of interaction, and not before), and are not static. Traffic stops might 
also change in relation to forces outside of the context. In other words, participants bring 
identities into the traffic stop setting that possibly change the nature of that setting. A 
relevant example might be what some contend is Black Americans’ increasing willingness 
to speak up and assert their rights at traffic stops, possibly spurred by the advent of the 
Black Lives Matter movement. In this example, a social force changes how participants 
might identify during a stop; the motorist might identify as a person with agency who has 
the right to ask questions and question authority, or she might identify as someone who is 
oppressed and under attack. 
Despite the common notion that the officer has the power to question and direct 
while the motorist does not have such power, the dynamic of the traffic stop does not 
necessarily preclude agency on the part of the less powerful, where “agency” is the 
capacity to act in the situation. In this scenario, the police officer fills the role of 
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“institutional authority,” where the institution is “government” either on a local or state 
level. Thus, traffic police possess given or endorsed agency; at issue is the agency of the 
motorist. Smith and Guthrie’s conversation analysis of police-citizen traffic interactions 
(in Smith, 2010) showed that both parties’ talk evoked the institutional authority of police 
and that turn-by-turn, both parties agreed to the institutional role and thus showed agency 
on the part of the less powerful party. For example, Smith and Guthrie argued that 
latching speech (near overlapping) and offering accounts constituted evidence that both 
parties negotiated institutional authority. Their analysis of contextualized talk 
demonstrated that 1) traffic police represent institutional authority and 2) motorists who 
have been stopped can in some cases enact agency by negotiating an agreement with that 
authority. However, their study also emphasized the limited control motorists have over 
the outcome of their situations. The present study will seek to determine whether the 
motorists in the two videos analyzed negotiated this power dynamic of authority and what 
kind of linguistic options they had to exercise the rights they perceived themselves to 
have. 
When power is introduced into a local setting, the contextualizing of identities by 
the participants might be expected to occur through resistance or the testing of that power. 
It is possible that a motorist revealing “stance” is a mode of contextualizing— aligning 
oneself in relation to the other person. Goffman (1981) argued that a participant’s stance 
reveals or becomes an issue in the talk, either explicitly or implicitly, and represents a 
“shift in footing.” Smith (2010) concluded that through such “shifts in footing” (p. 176), 
motorists commonly resist the institutional representative, that is, the officer, by asserting 
agency in the form of offering explanations and accounts for their behavior; these 
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accounts contrast with the narrative given by the officer for their stop. While Smith’s 
study offered analysis of these contextualizing negotiations around power at traffic stops, 
her study did not include overt or direct assertions of opposition between these two 
parties. In light of these findings, the data in this current study raise a number of issues: 
How far can Matoesian’s concept of resistance-talk go? How do traffic stop encounters 
unfold when the motorist expresses direct resistance to traffic police? What happens when 
the officer and motorist do not settle on an agreement with regards to the institutional 
power traffic police have, as per Smith and Guthrie’s concept of negotiation (1996)? And 
what greater contexts contribute to the asserting of agency and the resistance to 
institutional power? 
The Particular Status of Directives
In order to think more deeply about the above questions, I will examine linguistic 
features that occur in the traffic stop setting; of particular interest in traffic stops is the 
speech act category of directives. Speech acts are distinguished by their illocutionary 
class, as set up by Searle (1976). Distinguishing one illocutionary type from another helps 
to understand the difference in force between utterances; in regards to the data analyzed in 
this paper, distinguishing types may make it possible to determine whether and how a 
speech act was understood or not. Bach and Harnish (Bach, 1998) adapted Searle’s 
framework, and they distinguished his classes of directives as advising, admonishing, 
asking, begging, dismissing, excusing, forbidding, instructing, ordering, permitting, 
requesting, requiring, suggesting, urging, and warning.  
Directives, perlocution, and responses.
The purpose of a directive is, as Searle (1976) pointed out, usually an attempt to 
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get the hearer to act in some way, or, alternatively, as Dorschel (1989) described, to get 
the hearer to ascribe to some value, attitude, or belief that may or may not trigger an 
action. In the data analyzed in this thesis, the officers gave directives that implied they 
wanted the motorists to believe in or value the formers’ positions of institutional authority 
over the motorists. According to Dorschel, the conditions of satisfaction for the speaker is 
that the action requested is fulfilled by the hearer. In other words, the hearer does not have 
to actually share the beliefs or values the directive implies, but only act as if they do. 
In his philosophical paper about the conditions of fulfillment of directives, 
Dorschel, perhaps unconventionally, applied a semantic argument about truth conditions 
for the reasons represented by the directives but the not truth conditions for the directives 
themselves. His theory differentiated between truth conditions and felicity conditions by 
focusing how reasons the speaker would expect the hearer to fulfill a directive are given 
rather than focusing on the contextual truths of the directive. One deals with intention 
(reasons) while the other deals with contextual conditions (felicity), even though one 
might or might not rely upon the other. “Truth conditions” is perhaps a misnomer—the 
term as Dorschel used it is taken from semantics, or meaning, and creates a form of 
analysis that can accommodate intention by treating the directive (or action) as 
representing reasons the speaker might feel justified in their utterance. 
Dorschel built upon Grice’s (2001) foundation of reasons: if directive speech acts 
reflect the conversational background or situation in which they occur, they act as 
practical reasons for the hearer to act, at least from the speaker’s perspective. For 
example, if A has a gun visible to B and says, “Get on the floor,” the gun acts as a 
practical reason for B to comply with the speech act. Because Dorschel focused on 
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reasons underlying directives and not the acts themselves, this thesis talks about truth 
conditions rather than felicity conditions. In my analysis, I use this notion of reasons to 
help define directives specific to this traffic stop encounter and identify and categorize 
their correlative responses. Kissine (2013) operationalized this notion as X being the 
directive speech act of A, and B being the hearer; the reasons for B to bring about the 
truth of X may or may not be enough to cause B to actually bring about the truth of X. 
Here, X and the truth of X are distinguished, and the relationship between X and the truth 
of X is defined as the perlocution. 
Dorschel (1989) also argued that a speaker’s directive usually claims to have some 
authority over the hearer that can stand in as reasons. For example, the officers in these 
data might have used their institutional authority as the reasons for the motorists to fulfill 
the directives given. Therefore, the relationship between the directive and the bringing 
about of the truth of the directive can depend on not only the belief in the reasons but also 
the knowledge of (or at least the willingness to acknowledge) presumed authority, 
institutional or otherwise. This presumption would give A the right (at least under certain 
conditions) to issue certain directives and expect to be obeyed. In my data, 
institutionalized authority was certainly at play and possibly other types of authority, as 
well. 
Dorschel’s criteria for understanding a directive are below:  
A hearer understands an imperative, 
1. if he knows the conditions under which he would bring about the desired
state, and
2. if he knows the conditions under which the speaker would have
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convincing reasons to regard an imperative as either 
a. valid (that means: normatively justified) or
b. efficient (that means: supported by potential sanctions sufficiently
deterring from disobedience) (p. 329).
Dorschel went on to describe how hearers show understanding of a speech act; he 
categorized hearers’ responses to understood directives as accepting them (carrying them 
out), reserving judgment (“I cannot decide at this moment” or “I may have some questions 
about that”), or rejecting them (not carrying them out or outright refusing to do so). 
Dorschel concluded that the reasons the speaker should expect the hearer to perform the 
action of the directive is a major component of understanding the directive. His classic 
example is the gunman shouting “Hands up!” wherein the gun might function as a reason 
for the hearer to comply. Without a gun as a reason, a hearer may reject the directive 
because there is not reason enough (i.e. “You are not the boss of me” or a moral rejection 
“I won’t be party to this illegal act”). If the person with the gun was a police officer, there 
might be reasons other than the gun compelling the hearer to obey, such as the officer’s 
institutional authority. In this scenario, it is presumed that the act of obeying demonstrates 
understanding of the reasons and acceptance that a directive was given. 
In general, success of communication is measured qualitatively when the 
communication has been taken as intended. Since there is inherent difficulty in judging 
communication as successful or not, it is important to not assume that the directives 
themselves that are not carried out were misunderstood or not taken as intended. What 
previous research shows is that a directive can be understood, acknowledged, and not 
followed; in other words, that a directive is not followed does not necessarily mean the 
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directive was not understood. Thus, I will use the aforementioned notions and definitions 
below to help identify and categorize directive speech act types and their communicative 
successes. 
Threats.
Threats also play a role in the data analyzed in this study, particularly as they 
correspond to institutional authority. Shon (2005) defined threats as direct and conditional 
speech acts with unfavorable consequences for the hearer. He categorized threats and 
warnings as part of a fraternal order of force. He contended that the police’s ability to 
coerce and use force is always an ever-present factor in the unfolding of an encounter and 
not merely a precondition to be invoked at chosen times during the encounter. Thus, this 
potential deployment of coercive force manifests itself in all directive utterances, which 
include gesture, artifacts, and words: requesting, advising, questioning, warning, and 
ordering. Shon’s argument was that in police-citizen encounters interaction as we usually 
use the term is mitigated or perhaps non-existent, whereas transaction takes over; that is 
to say, in traffic stop settings “messages are not ‘exchanged’ [between two parties] but 
‘delivered’ [from one party to the other]” (p. 830), or in this case, from the officer to the 
motorist. The difference lies between an interaction that is mutually engaged in as a free 
exchange and an interaction where one party dictates how the other party should 
participate. The implications are, then, that any message from an officer might and 
perhaps should be taken by a stopped motorist as a warning or threat, or at least a 
potential one. In fact, Fraser (1998) and Storey (1995) argued that a major feature of 
threat is power or authority over others and that the threatener must believe they have the 
ability or power to carry the threat out as well as the intention for the threat to be taken as 
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such. In his discussion, Fraser defined three conditions that constitute a threat: 1) 
intention to threaten an action 2) the action must be unfavorable to the hearer, and 3) the 
intention must be to intimidate. Because intention is a difficult construct to navigate, 
Dorschel (1989) has argued that a threat must also be mutually understood and that it is 
usually made for the speaker’s benefit (to change the behavior or coerce some action from 
the hearer (Searle, 1976)). In light of Dorschel’s observations, I would argue that in 
addition to the speaker holding such a belief, the hearer must also believe that the speaker 
has the power or ability to carry out the action of the threat. 
Dorschel used speech act theory to identify participants’ understanding and 
acknowledging of threats. Below, I use speech act theory to look for evidence of threats 
in the data between police officers and motorists. Based on previous literature discussed 
in this review, I use four criteria to identify threat-making: 1) institutional power held by 
the speaker, 2) contextual (local) power and authority held by the speaker, 3) the 
speaker’s ability or power to enact the threat, including the accoutrements to enact the 
threat, and 4) mutual agreement between the speaker and hearer that the threat was made, 
with potential unfavorable outcomes for the hearer. 
According to Smith (2010), the power dynamic of negotiated authority in traffic 
stops is implicit in most encounters, but when paired with warnings and threats, 
negotiating power may produce conflict-talk. This consequence might depend on how the 
threats are given and taken. While examining how language and context together 
influence the degree of threat and lawfulness in an utterance, Storey (1995) argued for the 
difficulty of constructing a context-independent or an identity-independent definition of 
threat; the definition of threat is always contingent upon the identities that the participants 
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bring to the setting. For example, in the greater context of the civil rights movement, the 
identity of a Black American might play a larger or different role at a traffic stop than  
that of a white American, and can potentially change the nature of threat. This argument 
suggests that the power of threat is multi-fold; it originates from multiple sources and 
presumably has multiple consequences, including how a speaker may choose to threaten 
and how and when a hearer may respond. 
Contributions to Escalation
The discussion of the literature thus far helps to elucidate how language reflects 
power dynamics in traffic stop settings and how threat-making serves as an imposing 
factor that could lead to conflict. Research on language that contributes to escalation of 
conflict has focused largely on organization and structure (speech acts, rhetorical moves, 
format tying) and among children (Brenneis & Lein, 1977; Boggs, 1978; Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 1987; Maynard, 1985). In contrast, Grimshaw (1990) and O’Keefe (1977) 
researched adult disagreements and laid the foundation for constitutive language study on 
how discourse and conflict might be related. Through their formative research, they 
divided disagreements into three phases: inciting event, opposition, and reaction. 
Scott (1998, 2002) described the linguistic features that constitute these phases in 
face-to-face disagreements between adults; in particular, she looked at how specific 
linguistic features contribute to the disagreement and sought to discover how these 
features determine the course and outcome of the disagreement. In her 1998 study, Scott 
defined two types of disagreements: background and foreground, both located on a 
continuum of characteristics shared. She argued that background disagreements are 
marked by long turn-taking, few turns per disagreement, explanatory talk utilizing 
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evidence, use of implication and inference, and particularly by lack of explicit 
disagreement. Scott described these background disagreements as calm and measured. 
Conversely, foreground disagreements are marked by short and overlapping turn-taking, 
explicit opposition, and the use of negation, repetition, indexical second-person pronouns, 
questions, modals, and discourse particles. Her analysis uncovered three categories with 
regard to foreground disagreements that might be relevant to the proposed study:  
collegial disagreements, personal challenge disagreements, and personal attack 
disagreements, which she found formed a “continuum of increasing hostility” (p. iii). 
I was able to find only very context-specific research on disagreement, such as 
Lorenzo-Dus’s (2008) TV courtroom study, Nissi’s (2013) research on Bible study 
sessions, or Maschler and Nir’s (2014) case study of Hebrew discourse. Each of these 
studies discussed “conflict-talk” and used aspects of Scott’s analysis to help identify and 
index disagreements. Recent research, however, has not furthered Scott’s findings 
generally or specifically, and particularly not in the very specific setting of traffic stops. 
When looking at how arguments are constructed, Goodwin (2006) focused on how 
participants orient to previous utterances in order to organize their following utterances 
using “format tying.” The research showed that participants shape their arguments as they 
go, dependent upon retrospective and prospective utterances. Participants do this, 
Goodwin argued, by using language structures that occurred earlier in the conversation. 
Language structures can include single words, phrases, or even syntactic structure. For 
example, if one participant says “You have to go,” the other participant might say “I don’t 
have to do anything.” Orienting to the structure of the first participant, the second 
participant repeats “have to” as a contested action. Goodwin contends that format tying is 
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an explicit marker of countering an opponent. He concluded that in some cases format 
tying is a way for a participant to negotiate autonomy and might mark changes is social 
positioning. 
Format tying also can involve refusals to respond in sequentially appropriate 
ways. Since language is mirrored and repeated in format tying, Goodwin found that a 
consequence might be that questions are not answered and issues are evaded, resulting in 
directives going unfulfilled. As demonstrated in the data below, the repetition that occurs 
can fruitfully be analyzed in terms of Goodwin’s model of analysis. 
Relevant insights from previous research have provided a basic understanding of 
how linguistic features link discourse to conflict, while more recent research has argued 
that institutional power is context specific and is often agreed upon (or not) wherein the 
authority is implicated in threat-making. The research suggests that those threats are ever- 
present in settings like traffic stops, possibly contributing to conflict-talk that might lead 
to or even exacerbate violence. Since each of these arguments clearly applies in a traffic 
stop setting, the analysis below investigates the intricacies that are involved in two 
encounters that erupt in violence and possibly determine the larger roles language played 
in such dire outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 
Design and Methods 
This study of video recordings of interactions between police and citizens used an 
exploratory, multiple case-study design to look at escalating language. My analysis was 
primarily qualitative. My choice to do a qualitative analysis arose from a desire to clarify 
some of the confusion and concern by the public and the press around these high-profile 
interactions, as well as to perhaps lay the foundation for future work that might involve 
creating appropriate procedures for police officers who might encounter situations like 
these. In this study, I treat talk between police and citizens as a kind of organizational or 
institutional talk, likely setting for the parties involved relative expectations of how these 
encounters should unfold. I use discourse analysis and speech act theory to look at social 
and institutional aspects present in these data. 
Criteria for Data
For this study I analyzed two segments of conversation between police officers 
and Black American citizens at traffic stops. The data are video recordings captured by 
police dash-cameras. All the footage I used has been made public either on YouTube or 
released through news sites. I chose these encounters because of the nature of the traffic 
stops, which were minor infractions, and the outcomes of the traffic stop, which were 
physically aggressive and resulted in arrests during which both parties were injured. My 
selection was also influenced by the attention the encounters received by the public and 
press, particularly in Sandra Bland’s case after the dash-cam footage was released in 
response to her death in jail three days after her arrest. The criteria for choosing data 
included the following:  
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1. occurred between a single police officer and an unaccompanied Black
American citizen,
2. initiated as a non-violent stop and not a summons or report,
3. led to violence between the officer and citizen, and
4. be recent (within 5 years)
First, I set these criteria based on recent overwhelming public outcry in response 
to some officers’ violent encounters with Black Americans. During my review of the 
tremendous amount of data that fits the first criterion, I rarely encountered officers of 
color. In the Sandra Bland case, the officer involved has a Hispanic surname, though it is 
difficult to tell what his race is or how he identifies racially. I did not encounter data 
involving a single Black American police officer and a Black American motorist. 
Second, much of the public outcry is centered on cases that seem to begin as a 
routine traffic or sidewalk stop. Part of my criteria were that the stop must be made by on-
duty officers and for minor violations, such as speeding, broken lights, or failure to signal. 
I excluded any encounters that began with a call for help or a report either by another 
officer or a citizen. I chose this criterion to avoid encounters that begin with violence or 
dangerous activity or encounters where the officer’s weapon is already drawn. The 
dominant presumption by the public is that these stops for minor infractions can and 
should go smoothly and end without escalation to violence. 
Third, I used the World Health Organization’s (WHO, 2016) definition of 
violence as "intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a 
high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or 
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deprivation" (para. 5). Lastly, I used recent data to better address the prevalent anxiety 
around encounters such as these that have sparked several movements and protests in the 
recent years. 
Analysis Procedures
Much of my analysis was based on the results from my pilot study (Haley, 2016), 
which I approached from a Discourse Analysis perspective, and applies the constructs 
discussed in the literature review. Within this broad framework, I took an exploratory 
approach. As in my pilot study, my first step was to transcribe the conversations using 
basic transcription, including pauses in seconds (ex. .5 for five seconds) and noting some 
overlapped speech with brackets. Since these data contain so many orders and threats, I 
used speech act theory (Searle, 1976), particularly focusing on directives and then 
narrowing down to orders and threats. Using the definitions outlined in the literature 
review, I identified all the directives. Next, I categorized the type of directive being used 
and coded each one according to Bach and Harnish (1998). Finally, I identified which 
speech acts were a response to the directives and categorized them according to 
Dorschel’s classes (1989). I used Dorschel’s philosophical argument as a foundation to 
discuss locutionary-illocutionary acts, but focused primarily on perlocution in an attempt 
to understand those responses given to the threats. I counted the number of directives to 
highlight their salience and compare between the two encounters. I also examined the 
extent to which the directives and responses tended to correspond. 
The coding process was iterative; how I defined one utterance sometimes changed 
how I defined the next or the previous utterance. Some coding is multifunctional and 
poses categorical problems. For example, “get out of the car” is categorized as 
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imperative/ordering, but “get out of the car now” complicates the utterance by including 
the aggravator “now.” The difficulty lies in the difference of perception between the 
speaker and the hearer; of course, participants may perceive illocutionary force in 
different ways. The guiding factor was what came after the problematic utterance—that is, 
its uptake. I have assumed that Dorschel’s (1989) classes of response provide an objective 
framework to judge how the utterance was taken. 
I frequently encountered ambiguity between instructing and ordering since both 
types of these utterances often use imperative forms. Haverkate (cited in Martinez-Flor & 
Uso-Juan, 2010) suggested that the difference between instructing and ordering lies in the 
benefits of carrying out the act. The benefits of an order would be exclusively for the 
speaker whereas the benefits of an instruction would be for the hearer. I made discerning 
judgments about my data using this definition based on lexical choices, tone, and how 
utterances were structured. For instance, I coded “Take a seat back in the car so we can 
close the door” as an instruction but coded “Put your feet back in the car so I can close the 
door” as an order. 
After coding utterances, I looked at which directives conveyed reasons for the 
speaker to believe their directive would be fulfilled and whether the hearer seemed to 
share in those beliefs. I applied Dorschel’s philosophical analysis and Kissine’s formula 
to aid in my qualitative analysis of the relationship between illocution and perlocution. 
This process made up the bulk of the analysis.
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Chapter 4  
Analysis and Discussion 
This section will review the data, case by case, first from a quantitative 
perspective and then from a qualitative one. The quantitative analysis provides a way to 
see how the directives were distributed between the speakers and also how responses were 
given in proportion to the directives the speakers used. This quantitative analysis also 
helped to direct the qualitative discussion and to explore how the coding reveals the 
nuances of the interaction. 
Case 1: King-Richter Data
The first case involves data from the King-Richter encounter. (See Appendix B, 
Case Study 1 for transcript.) In June, 2015, Breaion King, a petite 26-year-old Black 
American woman, was pulling into a Wendy’s parking lot in Austin, Texas when police 
officer Bryan Richter pulled in behind her parked car. As King exited her vehicle, the 
officer approached her, asked her to get back into her vehicle, and warned that she was 
being stopped for speeding. According to the officer, King sped past his radar at 50 MPH 
in a 35 MPH zone. Later, King, an elementary school teacher, claimed she was on her 
lunch break and turned into the parking lot, unaware she was being pulled over. On the 
video, the speaking begins with King exiting her vehicle and the officer’s approach and 
caution. 
The encounter is relatively brief: King was handcuffed and put in the police 
vehicle by 2:50. At the beginning of the encounter, officer Richter asked King to get back 
in her vehicle. King got in her car but did not close the door. After King asked whether 
she could be given a ticket even though she was parked, and after she produced her 
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license, Richter asked King to put her feet in the vehicle so he could close the door. At :55 
King responded by asking “Can you hurry up?”, and Richter immediately reached into the 
vehicle and instructed King to exit. With that reach, a physical struggle began, and officer 
Richter pulled King out of her vehicle, flipping her onto the pavement. Richter struggled 
to move King’s arms behind her back, but King resisted. Richter and King struggled to a 
standing position, and Richter flipped King onto the pavement again. Several times, the 
officer called for King to stop struggling and to put her hands behind her back. King cried 
out in pain several times and repeated that she was trying to comply. Finally, Richter 
handcuffed King, picked her up by her arms and bent her over the hood of the police 
vehicle as other officers arrived. 
This encounter received considerable media attention both because of the 
participants’ relative size difference and the amount of physical struggle between them, 
and because of the conversation between a second officer and King in the back of the 
police vehicle about race during which that second officer claimed that white people are 
afraid of Black Americans because of the latter’s “violent tendencies.” This conversation 
was seen by many as evidence of racial bias as a predisposition to racial profiling on the 
part of the police and as having potentially created a racialized context for the first part of 
the video during which King was arrested. In my investigation of how speech acts might 
have contributed to the escalation to violence, I do not analyze the second part of the 
video in which King is in the police vehicle; only the 2 minutes and 50 seconds of 
interaction between King and Richter are relevant to this study. However, given the larger 
sociocultural context of this study, acknowledging this later interaction is important. 
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Quantitative results. 
What became most apparent immediately about the King-Richter interaction was 
the sequencing of the officer’s speech acts: repetition of instructing that preceded 
repetition of stating that preceded the repetition of ordering. In the midst of ordering, one 
threat was made, “I’m gonna Tase you” (line 56), while trying to get King handcuffed. 
Notable were the 7 repetitions of officer Richter’s “Stop resisting!” (lines 26-32) and his  
9 repetitions of “Put your hands behind your back!” (lines 42-62), with one amplifier 
“Now” tagged onto the penultimate order. Of Richter’s 37 utterances, 36 were directed at 
King, and of those 2 were instructing, 3 were requesting, 1 was asking, 23 were ordering, 
7 were statements (constatives), and 1 was a performative “You’re under arrest” (line  
44). Table 1 below shows the total number directives each participant gave divided into 
directive type. Officer Richter used ordering the most, followed by instructing while King 
used questioning the most, trailed by ordering. 
Table 1 – K-R  Directives 
Types of directives used number of times by Richter 
King as percentage of total directives in selected text. 
Type Richter King
Ordering 83% (n=24) 22% (n=5) 
Instructing 10% (n=3) 0 
Warning 3% (n=1) 0 
Requesting 3% (n=1) 0 
Questioning 0 77% (n=17) 
TOTAL 29 22 
When looking at King’s utterances, I was able to find few accepting speech acts to 
tally. While most of King’s responses were constative speech acts, only 3 might be 
considered accepting: “I’m getting out” (line 36), “That’s what I’m doing” (line 63), and 
“I’m not trying to stand up” (line 65), all in direct response to ordering. In regards to 
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Dorschel’s categories of responses as accepting, reserving judgment, or rejecting, King 
reserved judgment 11 times total, seven times after an order, accepted six times, and 
rejected eight times. Several of those utterances were secondary utterances to a preceding 
utterance of a different type (i.e. “That’s what I was doing. Are you serious?” (line 63), 
where the first utterance I coded as accepting and the second I coded as reserving 
judgment). Below is a chart showing each response type as it corresponds to the type of 
directive given. The non-response category reflects utterances when King might have 
been confused or unable to respond. The chart highlights that King did not accept any 
directive except orders and that all of her rejecting was in response to orders. All three 
response types were used relatively equally in response to ordering with eight rejections, 
seven reservations, and six acceptances. 
Figure 1: Number of directives by Richter, the officer, per type across response category. Chart 





Instructing (3) Requesting (1) Warning (1) Ordering (24) 
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The data in quantitative form provide some bearings to see the proportion of 
directives used across the two parties. The officer’s utterances were far more repetitive 
than King’s and tended to increase in intensity, progressing from one type of directive to 
the next, whereas King’s utterances reflected various directives throughout the interaction. 
This quantitative analysis helped me to know where to focus my qualitative efforts to 
further discuss the interaction and explore how the coding makes sense of the interaction 
given the specific context. 
Qualitative discussion. 
Officer Richter began the encounter with King by instructing (“Ma’am take a seat 
back in the car please” (1)), then moved into asking questions (“Can I see your driver’s 
license?” (9)), followed by making statements (“Ma’am you were about to go inside 
without a wallet” (14)), and ended by making several orders in a row (“Put your hands 
behind your back!” (42)), most of them repeated. The sequencing certainly indicates 
escalation, as do the repetitions. Notable are the 4 repetitions of orders to “Stop resisting” 
in lines 26-32, followed by the 8 repetitions of the order to “Put your hands behind your 
back” in lines 42-62. Each order was given with no variation and a sustained intonation of 
intensity, regardless of the verbal response King gave. What Richter was looking for, 
presumably, was not a vocal response, but a physical one; it seems he disregarded all 
vocal responses and remained persistent in his locution. 
Richter’s high use of directives seems potentially appropriate for a traffic stop, 
even for one that did not unfold smoothly (cf. LaFave, 2004). The encounter began with 
varied speech acts, including requesting and instructing, interspersed with constatives. 
When Richter instructed, King complied: 
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5 RIC: Okay ma’am you’re being pulled over right now so I need you to take a 
6      seat back in your car. 
7 KIN: Are you serious. 
8 RIC: Yes, ma’am, I’m not joking. ((King opens the car door)) 
When Richter made a request, King complied again: 
9 RIC: ((As King gets back in car)) Can I see your driver’s license you’re being 
10  stopped for speeding. 
11  (.9) ((King reaches down and comes back up, presumably with her 
12  license)) 
Both of these adjacency pairs demonstrate that King understood Richter’s directives. 
When King asked a question that challenged Richter’s authority, he replied with an 
utterance that directly answered her question: 
13 KIN: But I’m already stopped so technically can you stop me? (.1) Cuz you 
14      didn’t pull me over because I’m parked. 
15 RIC: You only- ma’am you were about to go inside without a wallet, so I 
16  know you were only coming here because you know I was coming to 
17      pull you over. 
18 KIN: Uh huh. 
19 RIC: I can absolutely pull you over if you are already stopped, yes. Let me 
20  see your driver’s license. 
21 KIN: ((King hands him the license)) 
King gave an agreement marker “Uh huh” (line 18) and handed the officer her license. 
This traffic stop discourse seems routine so far in that the officer made requests, 
instructed, and reinforced his authority when responding to King’s question. In response, 
King complied with his order. 
In lines 13 and 14 above, King challenged the legitimacy of the stop through 
questioning. This directive (line 13) suggests King was looking for clarification on the 
conditions under which Richter was entitled to assert his authority; even if his reasons for 
stopping her were valid, King suggested that the stop itself might not be—that Richter’s 
window of opportunity for stopping her had passed. Kissine’s (2013) formula, the reasons
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for B to bring about the truth of X may or may not be enough to cause B to actually bring 
about the truth of X, is relevant here: King demonstrated her testing of the notion that 
Richter’s reasons for stopping her might not be sufficient to make the actual stop legal and 
to cause her to agree to hand over her license. In other words, she questioned the extent of 
his authority under local conditions and therefore the legitimacy of the stop itself. That 
King accepted his directive in line 21 indicates that Richter’s explanation was sufficient 
for King. Following Dorschel’s (1989) formula, I assume whatever value or belief Richter 
claimed with his explanation (i.e. his institutional authority or knowledge about the local 
situation) King accepted as valid enough to fulfill the directive and give Richter the 
response he presumably was looking for. 
Richter’s next directive, however, seems to be rejected by King: 
22 RIC: Take a seat back in the car so we can close the door. 
23         ((King appears not to move)) 
24 RIC: Put your feet back in the car so I can close the door. 
25 KIN: Could you please hurry up? 
The differences between line 22 and line 24 are plentiful. In line 22, Richter issued an 
instruction and used the pronoun “we” to perhaps include King in the action. Richter also 
used the phrasing “take a seat”, considered more polite than most imperatives. King’s 
body looks as if it was seated and oriented toward the driver’s side mirror with her feet on 
the ground with King looking at the officer, who was squarely facing her. Richter’s order 
was for King to take a seat back in the car even though she was already sitting down in 
the driver’s seat. It is unclear if King understood the directive, but her lack of movement 
or vocal response indicates she might have been either rejecting the order or reserving 
judgment. Richter rephrased his instruction as an order in line 24 by specifying that he 
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wanted her to put her feet in the car. Richter specified the action, used the less polite “put 
your feet” instead of “take a seat,” and replaced the pronoun “we” with “I.” All of these 
modifications indicate the second attempt was more aggravated than the first.  
This directive’s adjacency pair was rejected; King did not put her feet in the car, 
and she asked Richter if he could “hurry up.” The two non-acceptances could perhaps also 
indicate that King was not compelled by whatever reasons Richter had provided to expect 
her to fulfill his directives. 
If King was questioning the conditions of the stop, she might also have been 
questioning Richter’s authority to instruct her movements and positioning. His 
explanation for stopping her might not have extended to his authority to instruct her 
physically, and instead of questioning that authority as she had previously, her question 
deviated from the topic at hand to “Could you please hurry up” in line 24. This deviation 
might have prompted the subsequent struggle. Lawrence’s (2004) assertion that issues 
arise when officers ask questions unrelated to the stated original reason for the stop could 
be applied here to the motorist instead. The two adjacency pairs constitute two 
dispreferred responses, one of which was off topic. For Richter, these responses might 
have signified two consecutive rejections to his orders and perhaps informed his next 
directive, which changed the nature of the stop. 
When King did not make the gestural response Richter was looking for after 
ordering her to put her feet back in the car and when she asked if he could “hurry up,” he 
simultaneously bent down to grab King while instructing her and tagging a request onto 
the end: 
26 RIC: Okay, ma’am, stand up for me, okay? ((Richter bends down and reaches for 
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27          King)) 
This utterance is unusual in that in it Richter used “ma’am” for the first time 
simultaneously highlighting their social distance by using a politeness marker. However, 
that linguistic device was accompanied by Richer essentially performing three acts: an 
instruction with “Okay ma’am stand up for me,” a request by tagging “okay” after it with 
upward intonation, and a threat by suddenly grabbing King. After this point in the 
encounter, King rarely responded to Richter’s utterances, but mainly to his physicality and 
gestures. 
Many of King’s responses were clear reservations during which she either 
responded to the physical force rather than the locutionary force or she was not given a 
choice to comply. The following shows an example of both of these: 
39 RIC: Get out of the car now. 
40 ((Richter pulls King out of car and flips her to the other side of the 
41 parking space and onto the ground)) 
42 KIN: Aw…. 
43 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
44 KIN: Oh my — 
45 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! You are under arrest. 
46 KIN: Oh my God. Why are you doing this to me? 
As line 39 was uttered, King clearly did not have a choice to comply or not, as she was 
physically made to do the action that the officer had ordered; her vocal reaction was 
probably to the physical force and not the order itself. In line 44, King was again probably 
responding to the physicality and not to the locution of the speech act. While the officer 
appears to have been physically restraining her on the ground, most of her utterances were 
exclamations of “Oh my god” and questioning “Why are you doing this to me?” but 
King’s utterances that I coded as probably acknowledging Richter’s orders imply she had 
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already complied with his directive: 
63 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
64 KIN: That’s what I was doing! Are you serious? God. Stop. 
Rather than indicate a willingness to comply with an acceptance of “Yes sir,” for 
example, the first utterance in line 64 indicates that an act of compliance had already 
occurred and that King believed the officer had missed it or was ignoring it. Arguably, 
this acknowledgement represents perhaps a forced compliance rather than one resulting 
from the obligation that might be expected from motorists being stopped. Of course, it 
might be unexpected that a stop for speeding becomes physical, and King expressed what 
can be interpreted as dismay in the second utterance of line 64. While many of the 
utterances represent clear reservations, lines like 64 above and 53 below are coupled with 
rejections: 
52 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
53 KIN: Oh my God. Are you serious? 
In line 53, King exclaimed again “Oh my god,” and then followed it with another 
utterance that implies disbelief. The question “Are you serious” generally presupposes 
that the hearer cannot be serious. The implicature of this utterance is that King did not 
agree with the actions being taken and reserved her judgment about the order “Put your 
hands behind your back” possibly because she did not want to, felt she could not 
physically do it, or felt she had already complied. 
In either case, the reasons for Richter’s many directives might not have been 
shared or believed by King, which might be a clue as to why the encounter did not go 
smoothly. The categories of accepting, reserving judgment, or rejecting help to show how 
explicit those responses may or may not be. In the following sequence, King clearly 
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reserved judgment in lines 12-13: 
9 RIC: ((As King gets back in car)) Can I see your driver’s license you’re being 
10 stopped for speeding. 
11 (.9) ((King reaches down for something and comes back up)) 
12 KIN: But I’m already stopped so technically can you stop me? (.1) Cuz you  
13 didn’t pull me over because I’m parked. 
14 RIC: You only- ma’am you were about to go inside without a wallet, so I  
15 know you were only coming here because you know I was coming to  
16 pull you over. 
17 KIN: Um huh. 
18 RIC: I can absolutely pull you over if you are already stopped, yes. Let me  
19 see your driver’s license. 
20 KIN: ((King hands him the license)) 
When the officer asked to see King’s license, King reserved judgment and questioned the 
legitimacy of Richter’s request. This move can be interpreted as a questioning of Richter’s 
reasons for making the request. If King did not share the value of the officer’s authority, 
she may have believed his directive was not authorized. She clearly questioned his 
authority on a technicality specific to her particular situation (having pulled off the street 
and parked) and not necessarily in general. That is to say, the lack of congruity between 
beliefs shared by King and Richter might not be systemic, but rather contextual. Richter 
made clear in the next lines 14-15 and 18-19 how he perceived the context, thus defeasing 
the implications of King’s question that Richter did not have the authority to stop her. In 
line 20, King accepted and handed over her license. 
Again, this acceptance does not necessarily mean that King shared in the belief of 
Richter’s authority, but that there was some compelling reason for her to accept it; the 
hearer does not have to actually share the beliefs or values the directive implies, only act 
as if they do (Dorschel, 1989). Presumably, Richter’s utterances had something to do with 
convincing King of some legitimate reasons for fulfilling the directives; the two lines 14-
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15 logically argue the context, after which King uttered an agreement marker “uh-huh” 
17. Then Richter continued to answer the question directly in line 18, using a degree
marker “absolutely” and repeated his request as an order “Let me see your…” (18- 19). 
The compelling reasons for King could potentially have been the re-contextualization, the 
repetition, or the advancement from request to order. Regardless, King accepted the 
directive. 
At many times during the encounter, King rejected Richter’s directives or reserved 
judgment with statements such as “Are you serious,” an utterance which is not 
unmistakably clear in its meaning. Therefore, the officer would not know whether he had 
achieved his goal. Since a “hearer can understand without performing a speech act in 
response” (Dorschel, 1989, 325), uptake often requires explicit acceptance, reserving 
judgment, or rejection for the speaker to know their directive has been understood. 
The power struggle in the encounter seems to be steeped in institutional 
expectations that the motorist complies with each of the officer’s directives and the 
motorist’s expectations to be able to exert agency at least as far as to question the officer’s 
directives. A precedent seems to have been set for the latter in the encounter in lines 12-18 
analyzed above. In those lines, King questioned the directive and Richter offered an 
answer and repeated his directive, to which King complied. 
Escalation seems to have occurred quickly in line 24 “Could you please hurry 
up?” when King questioned the officer a second time with implications that 1) her time 
might be more important than the traffic stop and 2) Richter was moving slowly i.e. 
taking up too much of King’s time. This utterance was accompanied by the action of not 
moving her feet into the vehicle, as had been requested. The combination of not fulfilling 
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the directive and questioning the officer gave rise to what was surely an unexpected turn 
in the encounter: Richter’s reach, which led to King’s physical removal. 
If the conditions of satisfaction for the speaker are that the action is fulfilled by the 
hearer, officer Richter rarely achieved that satisfaction. Most of King’s responses did not 
fulfill the desired actions (mostly movements) that Richter was likely expecting. The 
directives went unfulfilled partially because King was most likely reacting to physical 
force, but also perhaps because she was being manipulated physically and unable to 
control her own movements. It is important to note that the utterance before the first 
physical gesture and subsequent escalation was a request that was met with the first 
refusal of the encounter—a nonverbal refusal of her failure to comply with Richter’s 
request for King to put her feet in the car. 
In his research on format tying, Goodwin (2006) discussed how participants refuse 
to provide sequentially relevant next actions. He contended that a first utterance or action 
is seen as providing a context for the next action. In other words, the first utterance sets up 
an expectation of what is to come next. This is especially true with the use of directives. 
In the King-Richter data, each participant refused to provide moves requested or ordered 
by the other. While Richter gave King clear orders, King’s compliance in some cases 
seems to have been physically impossible: 
59 ((Richter stands King up and kicks against her leg toward the ground. 
60 Richter flips King back to the ground. King’s arm buffers her fall)) 
61 RIC: Put your hands behind your back right now! 
62 ((King’s left leg is straight and right leg bent)) 
63 KIN: Stop. Will you let me get down, please. 
64 RIC: Get down! 
In line 61, while King was on the ground, Richter repeated for the seventh time, “Put 
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your hands behind your back” adding an intensifier “now.” His directive is clear, yet 
King responded with a directive of her own— “Stop” and a request to let her “get down” 
(63). In the video, King’s left extended leg seems to be prohibiting her from lying on the 
ground, yet Richter seems to be pushing her toward the ground. Presumably, King 
requested Richter to allow her to move her leg so that she could lie on the ground. Richter 
then responded with the order “Get down” (64). Since at this point King was already on 
the ground, both of the participants probably wanted King to untangle her leg and lie flat 
on the ground. King’s response indicates that she was unable to do so and was dependent 
upon Richter to allow her to carry out his directive, yet Richter’s response indicates that 
he believed King should have been able to do this action on her own. 
Whereas Richter’s directive “Get down” appears to be both format tying to King’s 
request by repeating her language and a refusal to provide the move requested by King, 
King’s response “Stop” does not format tie. The second part of King’s utterance in line 
63 makes a request to Richter, but uses a different format than the imperative orders 
Richter had been using, as well as different lexical items. King’s request uses an indirect 
speech act with “Will you let me…” and tags “please” onto the end of it. In the first 
utterance of line 69, again King did not format tie: 
65 KIN: […] Are you kidding me? Oh my god — 
66 ((Richter has both of King’s hands in one of his hands behind her back. 
67 Reaches for cuffs.)) 
68 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
69 KIN: That’s what I was doing! ((Richter handcuffs King while she is on her 
70 knees.)) Are you serious? God. Stop. 
The format tying happened when King repeated her directive in imperative form with 
“Stop” (70) which seems to mirror the imperatives Richter used and represents how the 
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two participants organized their argument. The word “stop” was repeated seven times in 
the encounter as an imperative, the first four times by Richter: 
26 RIC: Get out of the- Stop resisting! 
27 KIN: Oh my God. 
28 RIC: Stop resisting! 
29 KIN: Oh my God! 
30 RIC: Stop resisting! 
31 KIN: Ahh… [inaudible] 
32 RIC: Stop resisting!  
The format tying does not occur in adjacency pairs in this example, but rather later in lines 
(63) and (70). But in the excerpt below, the format tying does occur in an adjacency pair:
35 RIC: Get out of the car. 
36 KIN: I’m getting out. Let me get out. Do not touch me. 
Clearly King was trying to communicate to Richter, dropping the exclamations of the 
previous lines and adopting the format of directives with “Let me get out” and “Do not 
touch me,” even orienting to and mirroring the language Richter had just used with “get 
out.” The utterance constructed by Richter is countered by King. Her addition of “let me” 
is a precise orientation to the details of what was just said. In other words, Richter’s own 
words are used to counter his order, implying that Richter is the one who needs to take 
action in order to fulfill the directive by permitting King the agency to exit the vehicle on 
her own. 
Goodwin’s research suggests that format tying such as this shapes how arguments 
unfold. In the lines below, King and Richter use more and similar directives: 
37 RIC: ((Into his comm)) I need one at Wendy’s. 
38 KIN: Do not touch me. 
39 RIC: Get out of the car now. 
40 ((Richter pulls King out of car and flips her to the other side of the 
41 parking space and onto the ground)) 
36
King repeated her previous directive (line 36 and 38), as did Richter, but tagging an 
amplifier “now” onto the end (line 35 and 39). These lines come immediately after the 
clear format tying that occurred in lines 35 and 36. Rather than continue to format tie to 
each other’s utterances, the participants appear to have been using repetition of their own 
utterances to organize the talk. Repetition to organize seems to be the case also in lines 
50-57, when both participants repeated their own utterance for eight turns. King, however,
made two modifications after each repetition: 
50 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
51 KIN: Oh God. Why are you doing this to me? 
52 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
53 KIN: ((indecipherable)) 
54 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
55 KIN: Oh my God. Are you serious? 
56 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
57 KIN: ((Officer flips King)) Oh my God. 
In the midst of “Oh god” and “Oh my god,” two utterances counted as repetitions with 
one intensifier “my”, King repeated a rejection from earlier and a question from earlier, 
one that had perhaps still received no answer. Regardless, this sequence does not provide 
resolution or countering. 
The analysis of this case study revealed an escalation in types of directives used 
beginning with Richter’s instructing and rising to questioning, stating, and finally 
ordering. The majority of Richter’s directives were orders, one of which he repeated 8 
times. It seems as though King understood most of the orders, but often rejected them on 
grounds that imply she either did not share in the belief that he had the authority to expect 
her to carry out the directives or was not able to physically carry out the directives. 
The violence began after King did not carry out a directive to put her feet in the 
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car and instead asked the officer if he could hurry up. It is difficult to know why King 
refused to provide a relevant next utterance to Richter’s order, but it does show that King 
did not regard the order as one that needed to be carried out. The extreme physical 
reaction that Richter took was likely a surprise to King. During the physical altercation, 
Richter made few attempts to provide relevant next turns and used mostly repetition, thus 
intensifying to exchange. King, too, repeated many of her utterances, but also attempted to 
both ask questions and state that she was complying with Richter’s orders. Many of 
King’s exclamations seem to be responses not to Richter’s utterance but rather to his 
physical gestures. 
Case 2: Bland-Encinia Data
The second case study looks at an encounter between Sandra Bland, an African 
American woman on her way to a new job, and her arresting officer, Brian Encinia, who 
was an on-duty state trooper in Waller county, Texas, a fairly rural county northwest of 
Houston. (See Appendix B, Case Study 2 for the transcript analyzed here.) The dash- 
camera footage begins with Encinia finishing a citation for a different driver. He got back 
into his police vehicle and began driving. At an intersection, Bland’s oncoming car passed 
Encinia’s, and he promptly made a U-turn and began driving behind her. After about 30 
seconds, he sped up behind her, Bland moved out of Encinia’s lane to the right without 
using her turn signal, and Encinia put on his lights and pulled her over. 
Encinia approached her vehicle on the passenger side, told her she was being 
stopped for failure to signal, and took her license back to his vehicle with him. After 
about eight-and-a-half minutes Encinia returned to Bland’s vehicle. He asked her if she 
was okay, and Bland said no, describing the situation. Encinia asked her to put out the 
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cigarette she was smoking, and Bland asked why she needed to. Smith’s conclusions that 
motorists often exercise what agency they have seems relevant here. For Bland, this might 
have been part of her negotiation to maintain or even retrieve some of her power. Encinia 
then told her to step out of the vehicle. Bland said no, and verbal and physical struggle 
began with Bland in her vehicle and Encinia opening the driver’s side door. Eventually 
Encinia leaned down to pull Bland out of the vehicle and ended up pulling out his Taser 
and threatening to use it, at which point Bland got out of her vehicle. 
Encinia held his Taser on Bland as she exited and escorted her onto the sidewalk 
next to the police vehicle out of view of the dash-camera. No longer in view, the video 
provides audio of a physical struggle between Bland and Encinia during which we hear 
Bland cry out in pain, tell the officer he is about to break her wrist, and complain of her 
head being slammed into the ground. We also hear Encinia tell Bland that she would have 
received a warning if she hadn’t started causing problems. Bland complained openly 
about his treatment of her, implied Encinia felt powerful treating a Black woman in this 
way, and began calling him profanities. Eventually a white female officer arrived and 
helped to restrain Bland and put her in the police vehicle. 
This particular video went viral after Bland was found dead hanging in her jail cell 
three days later. Her death was ruled a suicide, which prompted multiple investigations 
into the incident and Bland’s background. For six months before her death, Bland became 
active in the Black Lives Matter movement, making several posts and videos educating 
others about Black history and encouraging people to make friends across racial divides. 
The investigations also revealed friends’ reports of depression. 
Some of this information might contribute to the broader context of racial tension in 
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which this encounter occurred and was understood. 
Quantitative results. 
This conversation contained 106 utterances total, 42 of which were directives 
(40%). Officer Encinia’s utterances totaled 53, 37 of which were directives (70%), and 
Sandra Bland’s utterances totaled 52, seven of which were directives. Bland had 29 
responses to Encinia’s directives: 14 were rejecting, 11 were reserving judgment, and 7 
were accepting. Encinia responded to Bland’s directives with one acceptance and one 
rejection to her questions and one rejection to her warning/threat. As shown in Table 2, 
imperative/ordering made up most of Encinia’s directives at 41%, followed by almost half 
that amount of warning/threat at 24%; questioning made up only 8%, and instructing 
trailed behind at 3%. 
Table 2 – B-E Directives 
Types of directives used number of times by Encinia 
Bland as percentage of total directives in selected text. 
Type Encinia Bland
Ordering 41% (n=15) n=1 
Warning 24% (n=9) 0 
Requesting 19% (n=7) 0 
Questioning 8% (n=3) n=6 
Amplifier as directive 5% (n=2) 0 
Instructing 3% (n=1) 0 
TOTAL n=37 n=7 
Note: Amplifiers as directive totaled 2, and both were 
“now” used immediately after another order but set 
apart in timing and emphasis. 
Noteworthy was that all of Bland’s rejections came after imperative/ordering or 
warning/threat from Encinia with one exception: a response to Encinia’s gestural grab 
for Bland (which I coded as a threat but did not count as an utterance); six out of nine 
reserving judgments came after imperative/ordering or warning/threat as well and the 
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other three after either questioning or requesting; two of her acceptances came after 
questioning, and the final acceptance came after imperative/ordering, and, significantly, 
after Encinia drew his weapon. 
Qualitative discussion. 
Similar to the first case, Encinia also used a high number of imperative directives 
and Bland asked several questions, but the responses of each participant deviated from 
what might be expected. Many of Bland’s responses were clear rejections where she 
stated explicitly “No” and followed with a statement of disbelieving Encinia’s reasons 
for asking her to get out of the car: 
29 ENC: Well you can step on out now. 
30 BLA: I don’t have to step out of my car. 
31 ENC: Step out of the car. 
32 BLA: Why am I- ((Encinia opens driver’s side door)) 
33 ENC: Step out of the car ↑ 
34 BLA: No, no you don’t have the right. No, you don’t have the right. 
These responses above illustrate clear understanding of the communicative act and 
suggest that Bland heard and understood the acts to be directives. That she 
demonstrated this understanding early on in the exchange provides evidence that she 
understood most of the similar directives that followed, particularly the 
imperative/ordering that reiterated “Step out of the car” (lines 3 and 5). 
Bland’s claim that the officer did not have the right to either force her out of her 
car or open her door suggests that she rejected the extent of the authority Encinia was 
claiming, which, in turn, suggests she assumed she knew the conditions under which 
Encinia would have thought he had convincing reasons to regard his imperative as valid 
or efficient and indeed to issue such imperatives in the first place. As discussed earlier, 
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Kissine’s (2013) formula is relevant to these data: the reasons for Bland to fulfill or 
accept the directive may not have been enough to cause her to accept the directive; in 
fact, she said as much. Dorschel’s (1989) formula is also relevant: whatever value or 
belief Encinia claimed with his reasons (i.e. his institutional authority or domain over 
Bland in this situation) was not accepted by Bland. Under Dorschel’s premise that even 
a rejection or lack of complying can be an act, in these data, Bland’s disbelieving or 
rejecting of Encinia’s reasons was the perlocutionary act in the example above. 
Ultimately, the act demonstrated a hearing and understanding of Encinia’s 
utterances as directives, which deems his communicative act successful from the 
perspective of communicating clearly his intentions. The argument here is that the 
understanding that a directive has been made is the criterion for success; even 
though conversations do not always go smoothly and participants do not always 
agree, it does not mean utterances were not understood. 
The section of the exchange during which Bland exited the car demonstrates a 
different directive and response from that of the above. Below, Encinia drew his Taser 
and made a new threat, resulting in a different response from Bland: 
63 BLA: So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car? 
64 ENC: ((Draws Taser and points it at Bland)) Get out of the car! 
65 BLA: And then you’re going to- 
66 ENC: I will light you up! 
67 BLA: Wow. ((Bland exits car)) 
68 ENC: Get out! Now! 
69 BLA: Wow. Wow. 
The reasons Encinia gave through his directive became compelling for Bland in line 66 
because she finally accepted the directive and carried out the action encoded in 
Encinia’s directive. Encinia aggravated his threat from the “or else” structure to “I will 
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light you up.” If this further explanation of the consequences of failing to comply was 
believed or good enough for Bland, her response to exit the car makes sense. The new 
directive, however, was accompanied by Encinia’s drawing of his Taser and pointing it 
at Bland; with this gesture came a reason, as well, whether it reinforced the utterance or 
vice versa: The drawn Taser functioned as a reason, and Bland accepted it. Either the 
new threat or the drawn Taser or both possibly gave Bland the new understanding of 
the directive that Encinia’s threats were not idle and that he was likely ready to carry 
out the action threatened. Clearly Bland recognized both the utterance and the gesture 
as a directive, understood both, and found the reasons compelling enough to accept 
through a gesture of her own: exiting the car. Again, the communicative act was a 
success for Encinia. 
This final acceptance is significant; there were few acceptances in this segment 
of data, and most of the ordering was met with rejection. A chart of pairings between 
directive type and response category shows this higher proportion of rejections to orders. 
Distribution of imperatives and threats was across all three response categories, as 
Figure 2 shows; however, the highest numbers corresponded to rejecting. 
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Figure 2: Number of directives by Encinia per type across response category. Chart includes total number 
of uses per type of directive by Encinia. 
Throughout the exchange Encinia added types of directives, presumably in an 
attempt to help him achieve the responses he wanted. But most of his acts of ordering 
remained the same (ex. “Step out of the car”), which elicited similar responses each time. 
Repetition is not considered the same utterance (i.e. each utterance is counted separately 
even if it repeats the same words) and therefore might not be taken in the same manner 
each time it occurs. The repetition between Encinia and Bland may signify an escalation 
that tested how far each participant would go before either complying or trying a new 
tactic. I would speculate that if there had been more variation of linguistic features within 
the types of directives, the response categories might have changed, as well. Kissine’s 
(2013) notion of reasons suggests that what was being said to Bland in each directive 
represented a set of values, claims, beliefs, attitudes, and that those were not compelling 
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questions used by Encinia received a response of acceptance. The relationship between 
the acceptance and the reasons for those questions, the perlocution, was framed in a way 
that Bland shared, agreed with, or believed. Generally, these data show implications of 
violent threat as compelling reasons between police and motorists and resistance to those 
reasons. 
The fact that Bland mostly accepted or rejected Encinia’s directives supports that 
she did acknowledge and understand the conditions under which Encinia would have 
convincing reasons to regard his directives as either valid or efficient. That Bland 
accepted some of the directives in the beginning of the conversation demonstrates that she 
might also have thought of the conditions as being valid or efficient, at least to a certain 
degree. Evidently, she did acknowledge and even commented on those conditions when 
she said “This is your job. I’m waitin’ on you” (line 18), implying that he had a job to do 
that was sanctioned institutionally and that she was at the will of Encinia doing that job. 
Bland was not disobedient at that point in the conversation, which might be reflective of 
her acceptance of the conditions up to that point or of her acceptance of the type of 
directives used up to that point.  
I found format tying began early on in the encounter and immediately precipitated 
the struggle to get Bland out of the vehicle: 
23 ENC: Are you done? 
24 BLA: You asked me what was wrong, now I told you. 
25 ENC: Okay. 
26 BLA: So now I’m done, yeah. 
27 ENC: You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If you don’t mind? 
In line 23, Encinia might have been implying that Bland’s previous utterance was taking 
too long or that he was unsure if she had more to say. After giving an explanation in line 
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24 Bland emphasized the explanation in line 26 by adding the adverb of time “now” and 
tagging the format tie “done” with an affirmative “yeah.” Two lines later Encinia 
instructed “Well you can step on out now” and Bland mirrored the language and used 
“step out” to respond: 
29 ENC: Well you can step on out now. 
30 BLA: I don’t have to step out of my car. 
Encinia continued to use this phrasing throughout the struggle, setting a structure for how 
the argument was organized. Furthermore, Bland format tied periodically with the latter 
phrase and others: 
52 ENC: Get out of the car! 
53 BLA: Don’t touch me. Don’t touch me! I’m not under arrest — you don’t 
54 have the right to take me out of the car. 
55 ENC: You are under arrest! 
56 BLA: I’m under arrest? 
In lines 53 and 54, Bland clearly tied her idea of specific parameters to the syntactic frame 
of “out of the car,” negating the implied conditions that the officer had institutional 
authority to remove her. She also used the active verb “take me,” presumably referring to 
Encinia’s reach for her physically, orienting to the context of force she perceived. Bland’s 
specifying that Encinia was trying to “take” her out of the car coupled with her direct 
refusal “You don’t have the right” transforms the argument from a local context to a 
greater context about authority and autonomy. Moving the argument from one realm into 
another might also escalate the argument. 
It is important to point out that Bland’s utterances might have provided 
opportunities for Encinia to state reasons other than his authority. Particularly, many of 
her questions went unanswered. For instance, when Encinia asked Bland to put her 
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cigarette out, and she responded, Encinia missed an opportunity to give alternative 
reasons or even reframe the reasons already given: 
29 ENC: You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If you don’t mind? 
30 BLA: I’m in my car, why do I have to put out my cigarette? 
31 ENC: Well you can step on out now. 
Encinia did not provide a relevant next turn in the sequence topic. Instead, it appears that 
he continued to use his authority as reasons for Bland to carry out his directives—reasons 
that Bland clearly had reservations about or rejected from the beginning of the interaction. 
While format tying appears to set the directive organization for much of the 
argument, it also appears to mirror the contextual struggle between the two participants as 
they vie to assert what each thinks is within their authoritative realm. One of the premises 
of format tying is essentially using a previous utterance to build upon, thus “one-upping” 
the other participant. The other premise has to do with providing sequentially relevant 
next actions, or rather the refusal to provide that. If both participants are format tying, 
often they are refusing to provide relevant next actions, presuming the next action should 
progress the conversation. When directives are involved, we would expect a subsequent 
preferred next action to be fulfilling the directive, whether that means answering a 
question, or fulfilling an order. 
To summarize the analysis, case study 2 revealed that all of the rejections that 
Bland gave were in response to Encinia’s ordering and threatening and not to other 
directives such as questioning or instructing. Encinia used more ordering than any other 
directive, which of course gave rise to more rejecting than any other response. Bland also 
made clear rejections to Encinia’s authority, demonstrating that she did not share in the 
value of his authoritative position to the extent that he did. For the most part, Bland 
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demonstrated that she did not believe in the reasons Encinia gave for her to carry out his 
directives, but some analysis revealed that perhaps Encinia did not make clear his reasons. 
Whether or not Encinia intended to draw the weapon well before he actually did, Bland 
demonstrated that she was compelled to carry out his directives only after he drew his 
weapon. That is to say, at least one of Encinia’s reasons for expecting Bland to carry out 
his order was his Taser, even if he did not have it drawn the entire time. 
Repetition also showed up in this analysis (see Appendix A). Encinia gave several 
similar orders, each time resulting in similar rejections. The orders vary in intensifiers, 
including tone, markers such as “now”, reformatting by moving from simple orders to “or 
else” structure, and lexical choice (i.e. “Step out of the car” vs. “Get out of the car”). 
Repetition also manifested in format tying. Several times Bland used Encinia’s structure 
to counter his directives. In this case study, however, it did appear that format tying 
always led to a refusal to supply a relevant next turn. In fact, many of Bland’s format 




My initial questions were 1) what kind of directives were used, 2) how were they 
responded to, 3) how did the directives contribute to escalation, and 4) how might power 
and authority have played a role. Ultimately, I sought to discover at least a partial 
explanation as to why these encounters unfolded they way they did. The dominant factors 
that indicated escalation were the repetition of directives given by the officers and the 
rejections to those directives. The data revealed that most of the directives the  
participants used were orders, and most of those orders were repetitions. The officers’ 
directives were either compelling or not, meaning they either persuaded the motorists to 
fulfill them or not. The answers to the remainder of the questions seem to lie in why those 
directives were either compelling or not, what the difference was between the successful 
and unsuccessful ones, and mostly hinge on reasons and the values behind them. 
Overall, directives that were repeated did not seem to be compelling. In both 
cases, most of King’s and Bland’s rejections were made in response to orders as opposed 
to other directive types, but particularly in King’s case. The analysis of case study 2 
demonstrated that Bland heard and understood Encinia’s directives during their traffic 
stop, that his communicative acts were successful from the perspective of conveying his 
intentions, and that language represented reasons behind Encinia’s directives that, for the 
most part, did not compel Bland to accept and carry out the actions. The analysis also 
made clear that Bland did not share in many of Encinia’s beliefs that stood for reasons to 
fulfill his directives. The compelling directive in this encounter was the threat of physical 
force with a Taser. Using a weapon as reason for Bland to carry out the order was more 
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persuasive than appealing to her belief in Encinia’s authority. Bland, however, continued 
to profess disbelief in Enicinia’s moral authority even while following his orders after the 
use of the Taser. This indicates a conflict that might be greater in scope than just this 
encounter or this study. 
In case study 1, directives were repeated and escalated in a fairly systematic way; 
officer Richter’s less intense directives at the beginning (requests and instructing) 
provided some reasons for King to comply, which might have persuaded King to both 
understand the truth conditions of Richter’s utterances and the premise that formed the 
basis of his authority and power. It seems that exercising his authority as reason was 
compelling to a certain extent, especially after King asked a direct question and Richter 
directly answered it. But using authoritative reasons was not always compelling, and 
certainly not after using physical force. Unlike officer Encinia, Richter did not use a 
weapon, and his use of physical force did not produce an action in King that satisfied 
Richter. In case study 1, it seemed unproductive for the officer to continue using tactics 
that were not producing the results he wanted, a conclusion that could perhaps be 
generalized across cases similar to this one. 
The analysis implies that if traffic police want their interactions to go smoothly 
when they stop a motorist, they not only need to employ careful language to elicit the 
actions they want, but also they need to employ language that represents reasons that can 
be shared, believed, or agreed upon by the motorist. It is likely that traffic police and 
some motorists at traffic stops do not share a value system, and it would therefore be 
difficult for the officers to have their expectations for acceptance met. As seen in these 
data, however, traffic police do have a variety of linguistic devices they can employ to 
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seek to convince the motorist of their reasons. 
In both cases, escalation occurred most rapidly immediately after the points at 
which one of the participants made a request or asked about something seemingly outside 
the scope of the reason for the stop. If traffic stops are expected to go a certain way and 
the officer sets the justification for the stop, then the officer’s deviation from that 
justification generally gives rise to issues (cf. Lawrence, 2004). In case 1, the officer 
asked the motorist to put her feet back in the car so that he could close the door, which 
might have been taken by King as a deviation and non-standard. When King replied 
asking if the officer could hurry up, Richter might have taken the utterance as too far a 
deviation from standard traffic stop interactions. In case 2, Encinia asked Bland to put her 
cigarette out, which might have seemed like too much of a deviation from the justification 
of her stop. It is important to note, as well, that Bland expressed frustration and doubt in 
the justification given to her for her stop, so it is plausible that any further deviation might 
ring disingenuous. The problematic nature of these cases can be seen at many points 
throughout the interaction, but escalation was most apparent immediately after directives 
that seemed unrelated to the stated original justification for the traffic stop. 
Relevant to these data, Goodwin’s research suggests that format tying shapes how 
arguments unfold and how directives might contribute to escalation. I conclude that these 
kind of countered utterances, when coupled with directives, also escalated the 
conversation in both cases in this study. When considering the sequence of what speech 
acts the officers in these data used, the analysis shows that the motorists responded more 
favorably when the officers used fewer orders and fewer repetitions, but not when they 
used orders in conjunction with physical force unless using a weapon. In both cases, the 
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switch from making requests, statements, and instruction to ordering happened in tandem 
with physical force. Perhaps if traffic police used a variety of speech acts to get what they 
want, they should also consider what kind of force to pair with a given speech act. There 
might be a variety of linguistic resources to use with a variety of physical tactics. If 
officers use the same speech act half a dozen times with no desired result, perhaps they 
could or should try other speech acts. 
The data show that continual format tying leads to refusals to provide sequentially 
relevant responses. In the data above, this format tying is reflected in repetition that, on 
the part of the officers, leads to refusals to answer questions or respond to cries for help 
from the motorists. I argue that both Bland and King were looking to engage in a free 
exchange (cf. Shon, 2005) in their interactions, particularly when expressing a desire to 
understand the situation. Several times they used constatives and asked questions, 
challenging the authority of the officer. The data suggest that the motorists were operating 
as if they were in an interaction and not a transaction, as Shon (2005) described police 
officers usually perceive the case to be. As Storey (1995) contended, a major feature of 
threats is the power or authority to carry them out, but if the hearer does not believe the 
speaker has or should have that power or authority, as Bland and King professed, one 
might argue that power is diminished to some degree. 
The presence of authority in both of these cases was invoked by each of the 
participants, and the power at play was most evident in the officers’ expressions that they 
had the authority to make the directives they were giving. That is to say, they believed 
they had the law on their side. These expressions were most evident in the reasons 
implicit behind their directives. 
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Dorschel’s (1989) argument that speech acts act as reasons in the situation in 
which they are uttered helps to shed light on the data analyzed in this thesis: even though 
the officers used a variety of directives, they did not make clear to the motorists through 
their speech that they were offering a variety of reasons, even after the motorists rejected 
those reasons. For example, it might be that officer Encinia’s reasons for Bland to get out 
of the car changed from authoritative (using his position as a representative of an 
institution) to forcible (using his ability to draw his Taser at any time) without expressing 
those reasons to her before the Taser was actually drawn. The officers’ lack of variety in 
reason-giving coupled with their variety in directives used presents compelling evidence 
that an explicit distinction should be made between what is being directed and reasons for 
what is being directed. The officers’ high use of directives puts them in the position of 
power to wield authority while also withholding their reasons. Following this logic, it 
might be prudent for traffic police to use speech acts other than or in addition to directives 
to help convey their reasons for taking the actions they take or expecting the actions they 
demand. 
In addition, I can conclude that physical force is not always in itself a compelling 
reason to fulfill a directive for motorists such as these, especially in light of the current 
climate of outrage over police brutality. Since the Black Lives Matter movement, most 
Black Americans are aware that the consequences of resisting authority-as-reasons might 
be made public, might be reviewed, and might have new implications for holding police 
accountable for the seemingly disproportionate violent encounters between them. In this 
era, perhaps Black Americans no longer accept the reasons given them in settings such as 
these and a new re-contextualization is needed. I would also argue that the burden lies 
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with the police to make concrete that re-contextualization and to work towards making 
these encounters go smoothly. They do, indeed, have the institutional authority and power 
to make those changes and direct the encounters so that they are safe for everyone. 
A shared value system often contributes to harmony in general, and there are 
implications here that suggest that either harmony needs to be found in ways other than a 
shared value system or a system needs to be put in place that both police and citizens can 
agree on. Successful communication presupposes at least some degree of shared values. 
Perhaps a more explicit training system can be developed, not only for police but also for 
citizens; if there are rules to the game of traffic stops, citizens need to be made aware of 
them and their limits, or, better yet, agree to those rules. 
Given the results of this study, it appears that the way escalation to violence 
unfolds might signify a struggle of not only language and power but also intersectionality 
of gender and race between the participants which warrants a discussion outside the scope 
of this thesis. If Bland continued to express disbelief in Encinia’s authority while carrying 
out orders, then other factors might be implicated in the dynamics between Black 
Americans, women, and police. My hope is that this study can provide a jumping off 
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Appendix A 
Tables with Examples 
Table A1 
Types of directives used number of times by Richter and King as percentage of total directives. 
Type Richter King Richter’s directives
Ordering 79% (n=23) 22% (n=5) Let me see your driver’s license. (18) 
Put your feet back in the car so I can close 
the door. (23)




(33) Get out of
the car. (36)
Get out of the car now. (40)
Put your hands behind your
back! (43) Put your hands
behind your back! (45) Put
your hands behind your back!
(48) Put your hands behind
your back! (50) Put your hands
behind your back! (52) Put
your hands behind your back!
(54)
Put your hands behind your back right
now! (59) Get down! (61)
Put your hands behind your
back! (64) Don’t stand up.
Instructing 14% (n=4) 0 Ma’am take a seat back in the car 
please. (1) Take a seat back in your 
vehicle please. (3)
Take a seat back in the car so we can close 
the door. (21)
Warning 3% (n=1) 0 I’m about to Tase you. (56)
Requesting 3% (n=1) 0 Can I see your driver’s license… (9)
Questioning 0 77% (n=17) 
TOTAL 29 22 
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Table A2 
Types of directives used number of times by Encinia and Bland as percentage of total directives. 
Type Encinia Bland Encinia’s directives 
Ordering 41% (n=15) n=1 Step out of the car. (32) Step out of the car! 
(34) Step out of the car. (36) Step out… (38)
Step out… (40)
Step out… (42)
Get out of the car
now. (42) Get out!
(47)
Get out of the
car! (53) Get




I said get out of the
car! (61) Get out of
the car! (65)
Get out! (69)
Warning 19% (n=7) 0 …or I will remove you (38)
….or I will remove you. (40)
…or I will remove you. (42)
…or I’m going to remove 
you. (43) I’m going to yank 
you out of here.(45) I’m 
going to drag you out of 
Requesting 19% (n=7) 0 Do you have your driver’s license and 
registration with you?(3)
How long have you been in 
Texas. (6) Do you have a 
driver’s license? (8) Where 
you headed to now? (12)
You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If 
Questioning 8% (n=3) n=6 What’s wrong?(4) You 
OK? (17) Are you 
Amplifier as 
directive 
5% (n=2) 0 Now! (69)
Now. (71)
Instructing 3% (n=1) 0 Well you can step on out now. (30)
TOTAL n=37 n=7 
Note: Amplifiers as directive totaled 2, and both were “now” used immediately after another order but set 
apart in timing and emphasis. 
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Appendix B 
Transcripts of Data 
This appendix contains transcripts of the segments of data analyzed in this paper. 
The first is a transcript of Case-Study 1. The second is a transcript of Case-Study 2. 
Before each transcript is the reference citation for the data and a summary of how the 
interaction begins. 
Case-Study 1: 
PoliceActivity. (2016, July 21). Police Dashcam Video Shows Violent Arrest of Austin 
School Teacher Breaion King [video file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z3sMpfm59hc 
King was parked in an outdoor parking lot. The dashcamera of the police vehicle 
was behind King’s car, perpendicular and facing left. King exited her vehicle as Richter 
exited the police vehicle and began speaking. He was about 20 feet away from her when 
began his approach. 
1 RIC: Ma’am take a seat back in the car please. 
2 KIN: I’m sorry? 
3 RIC: Take a seat back in your vehicle please. 
4 KIN: [inaudible] ((points to something past the officer)) 
5 RIC: Okay ma’am you’re being pulled over right now so I need you to take a seat 
6 back in your car. 
7 KIN: Are you serious? 
8 RIC: Yes, ma’am, I’m not joking. ((King opens the door)) ((As she gets back in 
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9 car.)) Can I see your  
10 driver’s license you’re being stopped for speeding. ((King reaches down for 
11 something and comes back up)) 
12 (.9) 
13 KIN: But I’m already stopped so technically can you stop me? (.1) Cuz you didn’t 
14 pull me over because I’m parked. 
15 RIC: You only- ma’am you were about to go inside without a wallet, so I know 
16 you were only coming here because you know I was coming to pull you 
17 over. 
18 KIN: Uh huh. 
19 RIC: I can absolutely pull you over if you are already stopped, yes. Let me see 
20 your driver’s license. 
21 KIN: ((King hands him the license)) 
22 RIC: Take a seat back in the car so we can close the door. 
23 ((King appears not to move her feet)) 
24 Put your feet back in the car so I can close the door. 
25 KIN: Could you please hurry up? 
26 RIC: Okay, ma’am, stand up for me, okay? ((Richter bends down and reaches in 
27 car)) 
28 KIN: No, why are you grabbing me? 
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29 RIC: Get out of the- Stop resisting! 
30 KIN: Oh my God. 
31 RIC: Stop resisting! 
32 KIN: Oh my God! 
33 RIC: Stop resisting! 
34 KIN: Ahh… [inaudible] 
35 RIC: Stop resisting!  
36 ((Horn Sounds)) 
37 KIN: I’m not- ((Richter stands back up)) 
38 RIC: Get out of the car. 
39 KIN: I’m getting out. Let me get out. Do not touch me. 
40 RIC: ((Into the radio)) I need one at Wendy’s. 
41 KIN: Do not touch me. 
42 RIC: Get out of the car now. ((Richter pulls King out of car and flips her to the 
43 other side of the parking space and onto the ground)) 
44 KIN: Aw: 
45 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
46 KIN: Oh my- 
47 RIC: ((Richter’s hands on Kings hands in front of her)) Put your hands behind 
48 your back! You are under arrest. 
49 KIN: Oh my God. Why are you doing this to me? 
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50 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
51 KIN: Oh God. Why are you doing this to me? 
52 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
53 KIN: [inaudible] 
54 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
55 KIN: Oh my God. Are you serious? 
56 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
57 KIN: ((Officer flips King)) Oh my God. 
58 RIC: I’m about to Tase you.  
59 ((Richter stands King up and kicks against King’s leg toward the ground. 
60 Richter flips King back to the ground. King’s arm buffers her fall)) 
61 RIC: Put your hands behind your back right now! 
62 KIN: ((King’s left leg is straight and right leg bent)) Stop. Will you let me get, 
63 down please. 
64 RIC: Get down! 
65 KIN: Are you kidding me? Oh my god- ((Richter has both of King’s hands in one 
66 of his hands behind her back. Reaches for cuffs)) 
67 RIC: Put your hands behind your back! 
68 KIN: That’s what I was doing! ((Richter handcuffs King while she is on her 
69 knees.)) Are you serious? God. Stop. 
65
70 RIC: Don’t. Stand. Up. 
71 KIN: I’m not trying to stand up. I’m trying to put my hands behind my back. God 
72 damn. Are you serious. Are you kidding me? 
73 RIC: Quit moving your hands. 
74 KIN: So you can put them back? That’s all. Are you kidding me? 
75 RIC: Get up. 
76 ((Officer 2 Arrives)) 
77 KIN: Ow! Look at him. He’s treating me like shit. I didn’t do anything. 
78 OF2: Spread your feet. 
79 KIN: What are you doing? I need a black police. 
80 RIC: Walk. 
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Case-Study 2: 
Texas Department of Public Safety. (2015, July 22). Sandra Bland traffic stop [video file]. 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CaW09Ymr2BA 
My analysis began at 2:18 when the officer pulled Bland over and the vehicles 
stopped. Encinia approached the Bland’s passenger side window a few seconds later. The 
transcript begins at 2:40. 
1 ENC: Hello ma’am. We’re the Texas Highway Patrol and the reason for your stop 
2 is because you failed to signal the lane change. Do you have your driver’s 
3 license and registration with you? (1.5) What’s wrong? 
4 BLA: [inaudible] (5.0) 
5 ENC: How long have you been in Texas? 
6 BLA: Got here just yesterday. 
7 ENC: OK. (.8) Do you have a driver’s license? 
8 BLA: Didn’t I give you my driver’s license? 
9 ENC: No, Ma’am. 
10 BLA: [inaudible] 
11 ENC: OK, where you headed to now? 
12 BLA: [inaudible] 
13 ENC: Give me a few minutes, alright. 
14 BLA: Alright. 
15 3:59 ((Encinia returns to his car for several minutes, then approaches Bland 
16 again.)) 
17 ENC: 8:39 OK, ma’am. ((Pause.)) You OK? 
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18 BLA: I’m waiting on you. This is your job. I’m waiting on you. When’re you 
19 going to let me go? 
20 ENC: I don’t know, you seem very really irritated. 
21 BLA: I am. I really am. I feel like it’s crap what I’m getting a ticket for. I was 
22 getting out of your way. You were speeding up, tailing me, so I move over  
23 and you stop me. So yeah, I am a little irritated, but that doesn’t stop you  
24 from giving me a ticket, so [inaudible] ticket. 
25 ENC: Are you done? 
26 BLA: You asked me what was wrong, now I told you. 
27 ENC: OK. 
28 BLA: So now I’m done, yeah. (.8) 
29 ENC: You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If you don’t mind? 
30 BLA: I’m in my car, why do I have to put out my cigarette? 
31 ENC: Well you can step on out now. 
32 BLA: I don’t have to step out of my car. 
33 ENC: Step out of the car. (.7) 
34 BLA: Why am I- ((Encinia opens driver’s side door)) 
35 ENC: Step out of the car! 
36 BLA: No, no you don’t have the right. No, you don’t have the right. 
37 ENC: Step out of the car. 
38 BLA: You do not have the right. You do not have the right to do that. 
39 ENC: I do have the right, now step out or I will remove you. 
40 BLA: I refuse to talk to you other than to identify myself.  
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41 ENC: Step out or I will remove you. 
42 BLA: I am getting removed for a failure to signal? 
43 ENC: Step out or I will remove you. I’m giving you a lawful order. (1.0) Get out 
44 of the car now or I’m going to remove you. 
45 BLA: And I’m calling my lawyer. 
46 ENC: I’m going to yank you out of here. ((Encinia reaches inside the car.)) 
47 BLA: OK, you’re going to yank me out of my car? 
48 ENC: Get out! 
49 BLA: OK, alright. 
50 ENC: ((calling in backup)) 2547. 
51 BLA: Let’s do this. 
52 ENC: Yeah, we’re going to. ((Encinia grabs for Bland.)) 
53 BLA: Don’t touch me! 
54 ENC: Get out of the car! 
55 BLA: Don’t touch me. Don’t touch me! I’m not under arrest — you don’t have the 
56 right to take me out of the car. 
57 ENC: You are under arrest! 
58 BLA: I’m under arrest? For what? For what? For what? 
59 ENC: ((To dispatch)) 2547 county fm 1098 [inaudible] send me another unit. 
60 ((To Bland)) Get out of the car! Get out of the car now! 
61 BLA: Why am I being apprehended? You’re trying to give me a ticket for failure- 
62 ENC: I said get out of the car! 
63 BLA: Why am I being apprehended? You just opened my — 
69
64 ENC: I’m giving you a lawful order. I’m going to drag you out of here. 
65 BLA: So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car? 
66 ENC: ((Encinia draws Taser and points it at Bland)) Get out of the car! 
67 BLA: And then you’re going to- 
68 ENC: I will light you up! 
69 BLA: Wow. ((Bland exits car.)) 
70 ENC: Get out! Now! 
71 BLA: Wow. Wow. 
72 ENC: Get out. Now. Get out of the car! 
73 BLA: For a failure to signal? You’re doing all of this for a failure to signal? 
74 ENC: Get over there. 
70
